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26 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--Meeting [redacted]
Director, PBS/ICS, 25 March 1986

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1. [redacted] and I met with [redacted] in Lackman's office. [redacted] said he didn't agree with [redacted] that the force multiplier topic was an appropriate one for the CIPC, although a CIPC "endorsement" might be useful. [redacted] saw several hurdles to overcome the most prominent being that interest in the issue was almost purely Defense-related, and therefore the cooperation of the services--not just the ACSIs--was necessary. Each service has a studies-and-analysis type group that addresses the battlefield aspects of the issue, and their products should first be "mined." This could be done in a "non-committee kind of way." The ACSIs themselves, however, have not done well in dealing with the topic, especially in the Air Force and Army. The Navy has done better because of its traditional yearning to "extend the horizon."

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2. [redacted] said that beyond battlefield-related considerations, the force multiplier concept was applicable in the procurement of, and specifications for, weapon systems, i.e., in the big decisions about weapons acquisition. His examples: the canon for the M-1 tank and the cancellation of the Army's DIVAD. He noted that Bill Perry also had thanked the Community for its inputs in the decision process. [redacted] added the example of "the Navy torpedo," but commented that all of them were "anecdotal." He concluded that it was a rare happenstance indeed to be able to cite intelligence as having made the difference in a procurement decision.

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3. [redacted] suggested that the approach to be taken in the CIPC inquiry might be to describe how intelligence could be made more effective as a force multiplier with a particular focus on the NFIP contribution. [redacted] acknowledged that attempts to integrate NFIP assets into support for military operations were valid. The main problem, however, is that the operators are remiss in not knowing how to ask for such support. To rectify this problem, an approach that is being worked is the development of the theater intelligence "architectures," none of which are very far along. They are "painful" exercises for the CINCs because their force component commanders have another master, namely their parent services whose interests may not coincide with the CINCs'. Among the services, only the Navy is effectively and earnestly working the issue.

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4. [] said that the intelligence architectures were being prepared within the DIA under the auspices of the ASD(C³I). They were given birth by the NATO Intelligence Support Steering Group chaired by Don Latham and including the D/ICS as the DCI representative. [] is involved with the group (NFIP-TIARA Review Board) that operates at the next lower level and that is chaired by Hawkins of ASD(C³I). The group meets every six months or so and oversees programmatic decisions to ensure that there is no needless duplication of effort.

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5. I said that I would be meeting with a Dr. Engel of the ASD(C³I)'s office to get his perspective. After musing about Don Quixote and so forth, [] concluded that the ultimate need was to bring the "operator's side to the table."

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